Chapter 13: The “German Phase,” 1940-1942
"This aimed not only at overcoming international dependency through autarchist economic development, but also at regaining Gibraltar from Britain and possibly expanding the modest Spanish possessions in northwest Africa at the expense of France. After the fall of France the attitude of most of the military hierarchy had changed in favor of getting in on the winning side, and Falangists were more ardent than ever in public expressions of Germanophilia.
Franco was now firmly convinced of German victory and would remain so, though in diminishing degree, until mid-1944. Yet, though eager to adjust Spanish policy to the new situation, he did not abandon his habit- ual caution. On June 3, he prepared the text of a letter to Hitler (that would not be delivered for more than a week) congratulating him on the German victory and identifying Spain with the German cause, which he chose to define on this occasion as a continuation of the struggle against the same enemies whom the Spanish Nationalists had already fought. At the same time he detailed the economic and military deficiencies that made it difficult for Spain to enter the war at that time. The next day Beigbeder handed the German ambassador a list of Spanish claims in northwest Africa. On June 9, the eve of Italy’s attack on France, Mussolini urged Franco to join him, but the Caudillo, sensing the frustration that might attend Italian and Spanish participation as long as France and Brit-ain were still resisting, politely declined in a cordial response.‘
The Spanish regime nonetheless continued to feel especially close to Mussolinis government, which it considered its own representative within the Italo-German Axis. Ciano, who had established a close rapport with Serrano Súñer, requested him to convince Franco that even if Spain could not enter the war for the moment it should demonstrate solidarity with the Axis by altering its position of neutrality to a declaration of non- belligerence.? Franco agreed immediately, and Madrid declared its new policy of nonbelligerence on June 12."
"It is nonetheless perfectly clear from the character of Spanish-German relations during the next eighteen months that the adoption of a position of nonbelligerence was the first step in an alignment with the Axis, though Franco hoped to set his own price for such alignment and to make it as high as possible
Two days later, on June 14, Spanish troops occupied the international zone of Tangier, but this was cautiously announced as simply a temporary wartime administrative measure. Since France, Britain, and Italy— three of the zone’s administering powers—were at war with each other, Spanish occupation would guarantee the neutrality of the zone and the adjacent Spanish Protectorate. The move was accepted by Britain (which officially reserved its full rights for the future),’ while Franco prudently ignored the crowd of proexpansionist Falangists who gathered outside the presidency building to cheer the move. "
"French Cameroons to Spanish Guinea. Moreover, Spain requested German heavy artillery and aviation to help conquer Gibraltar and German submarine support to assist in the defense of the Canary Islands, as well as large amounts of food, ammunition, fuel, and other materials. To the intense disappointment of officials in Madrid, Hitler refused to discuss the Spanish shopping list. In his hour of triumph he showed little interest in Spain one way or the other, though that attitude would soon change.? In response to such coolness, Franco temporarily suspended the resupplying of German submarines in Spanish ports that had been permitted on several occasions since the beginning of the year.”
Yet Franco had no real doubts as to who was becoming master of Europe. At the celebrations attending the anniversary of the Movement on July 18 he declared the Nationalist struggle in Spain to have been “the first battle of the New Order [in Europe],” adding that “we have made a pause in our struggle, but only a pause, for our task is not yet finished,” and boasting that Spain “has two million warriors ready to fight [enfrentarse] in defense of our rights." At this point Spanish diplomacy made an effort to detach Portugal from its traditional British alliance, bringing it into line with the Axis through a military pact with Madrid that would have virtually made Portugal a Spanish satellite. Salazar, un- like Franco, was genuinely neutral and firmly refused the offer, signing instead an additional Protocol to the existing Hispano-Portuguese treaty that merely provided for mutual consultation between Lisbon and Madrid in the event of foreign threat to the peninsula.”
From about the end of July, Hitler slowly developed more interest in Spains entry into the conflict as a means of securing control of Gibraltar and thus strangling Britains strategic position in the Mediterranean and Middle East."
"The Generalissimo and his most influential advisor, Serrano Súñer, were firmly convinced of eventual German victory and realized that Spain could profit from the coming New Order only if it entered the war in time. Yet they were apprehensive about involving their weak and unprepared country in the conflict as long as Britain retained significant powers of resistance. Whereas Germany for the time being had become almost self- sufficient, the Spanish economy could be totally devastated by a British naval blockade. To survive for even a brief period, it would require concrete guarantees of major assistance from Germany. Moreover, if a new Spanish empire were to be carved out of French Northwest Africa (concerning which contingency plans had been under way in the Spanish General Staff since June), new acquisitions would have to be firmly recognized and guaranteed by Germany from the beginning, when Spanish assistance still had value in Hitlers eyes. To wait until the final victory would be too late."
"Serrano was dismayed to find that Hitler wanted Spain to enter the war immediately while trusting in German good will to provide equipment and supplies, and refused to make any territorial commitments in northwest Africa, suggesting vaguely that Spain work out the details of a possible expansion with Italy. The foreign minister, Ribbentrop, was more aggressive and demanding, suggesting the cession to Germany of one of Spains own Canary Islands as a naval base, together with at least one port in any southward extension of Spanish Morocco. On Francos orders, this proposal was rejected with barely concealed indignation, and any agreement on entering the war for the moment was postponed behind a shield of Spanish territorial, economic, and military requests."
"the famous meeting at Hendaye on the French border. Franco presented what had now become the standard Spanish shopping list, territorial and economic, and was evidently prepared to enter the war at that point if Hitler would grant Spain control of most of northwest Africa.” This had been the dream of Spanish expansionists, such as they were, for forty years, and few ambitions were dearer to the heart of the Caudillo than domination of all Morocco and the Oran district. To the end of his days, Morocco would represent for Franco the golden illusions and fulfillment of his youth, and at one point he silenced the talkative Fuehrer with an hour-long monologue on the history of Spain's role in Morocco that reduced Hitler to yawns and probably also to the conclusion that Franco was no more than a provincial African colonialist. Unbeknown to the Spanish, Hitler had already decided to grant priority to a new alliance with what remained of Vichy France and had already said privately that there would be no point in alienating Vichy by giving away French colonial territory to a Spain that could not defend it. At Hendaye he told Franco that, given the need to conciliate France, he could offer Spain no guarantee at that time. After enduring some seven hours of the polite, fawning, and evasive but obdurate conversation of the “Latin charlatan,” as he called Franco, Hitler later declared that he would prefer “having three or four teeth pulled” to enduring such an experience again.”
Up to this point Franco had apparently held the ingenuous conviction that Hitler was a great leader friendly to Spain, while all obstacles stemmed from various mediocre or ill-intentioned subordinates. Hitler's refusal to grant Spanish requests angered him, and yet he had to agree that given the need to conciliate Vichy France,” Hitler could not at that time recognize all Spanish territorial demands. Hitler and Ribbentrop insisted on the signing of a secret protocol that would guarantee Spanish war entry when Germany should see fit, but Franco and Serrano refused a unilateral German draft which they replaced with one of their own. This document pledged Spain to adhere to the Tripartite Pact (the defensive alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan) and to enter the war against Britain at some unspecified date to be determined by the Spanish government after further consultation with Germany and Italy. The secret protocol thus lacked teeth and did not specifically bind Spain to any schedule of action.”"
"Londons concern was to maintain Spains neutrality and to keep Spanish territory free of German troops and bases. For the embattled British government, the strategic significance of Spain was threefold: (a) the fortress of Gibraltar controlled the mouth of the Mediterranean, vital to British interests; (b) the northwest coast and the Canaries, together with Spanish Africa, offered crucial access to the central region of the east Atlantic; (c) Spain was a direct geographic link with Africa, and particularly French Northwest Africa, which might play a significant role in the future. The British ambassador, Hoare, and foreign minister, Halifax, formulated a policy during the summer and fall of 1940 designed to promote political stability and neutrality in Spain through the judicious use of British naval power to provide adequate imports of food and raw materials to sustain the impoverished Spanish economy.” "
"The British policy of discreet sympathy and economic cooperation was accompanied by more devious tactics, especially the systematic bribery on a massive scale of some ten high-ranking generals. Surviving documentation has not made it possible to identify the latter, though they evidently included Aranda. "
"Meanwhile, Hitler peremptorily summoned Serrano Súñer to Berchtes- gaden in mid-November to demand that a date be fixed for Spain's entry into the war. Before leaving Madrid, Serrano insisted on a formal meeting with Franco and the military ministers. England’s recent success in the Battle of Britain had diminished ardor among the Spanish military hierarchy to enter the war on Hitler's side. Moreover, a six-page report prepared by the senior naval staff on November 11 emphasized the extreme military and economic hazards that would face Spain if it should enter the war while Britain still controlled the seas.*"
"After Serrano explained with candor and in detail the disastrous state of Spains military supplies and factories, compounded by severe shortages of basic raw materials and foodstuffs, Hitler finally slumped silently onto a sofa, realizing that Spain was probably in no condition to make a contribution to the war effort.”
When Serrano returned to Madrid on November 22, the National Council of the FET was in full session, a majority of its members favoring entry into the war. This, however, had little effect on Francos policy, which further demonstrated the extent to which Francos emasculation of the partido único served the purposes of his regime. Before the end of the month he assured the German government that Spanish preparations for war entry were about to begin, but still no date was set. As an inducement for Franco not to change his official stance, Britain renewed regular commercial relations under the old agreement, even though Franco restored supply facilities to German submarines on December 5."
"The German admiral apparently even recommended to Hitler that Spanish participation might be counterproductive in that it would open an enormous coastline to defend against
the British.” Soon afterward the Fuehrer turned away from Operation Felix—the projected assault on Gibraltar—to concentrate on the first stages of planning for the Russian invasion, while observing in a letter of December 31 to Mussolini that Franco “had made the biggest mistake of his life” in not entering the war immediately.”"
"Nonetheless, after a brief respite, pressures were resumed during the first two months of 1941. After three ultimatums at diverse levels during late January produced no result, Hitler continued with a long, harsh letter to Franco on February 6, telling him in no uncertain terms that in “a war to the death” no “gifts” could be given Spain, and threatening him with the fact that should Germany ever lose, the Franco regime would have no chance of survival. "
"Hitler then turned the Spanish problem over to Mussolini, leading to the only meeting between the Spanish and Italian dictators at Bordighera on February 12. Franco and Serrano Súñer had tried earlier to use the cordial relationship between the two regimes to obtain Italian mediation in their suit with Germany, but Mussolini had shown ambivalence, fearing that Spanish ambitions might interfere with Italys own prestige and goals in Africa. "
"Henceforth the German government desisted from overt pressure to force Spanish entry into the war, primarily because Hitler's priorities lay elsewhere and he did not judge Spanish participation to merit a very high price. The attitude toward Franco in the German regime was now universally negative (Franco in return had even denied to German officials that their aid was decisive in the Civil War),"
"Through the first months of 1941, Britain continued to follow its careful management of diplomatic and economic relations with Spain, on April 7 signing a new Supplementary Loan Agreement (against the opposition of the more pro-Axis members of the Spanish government) that extended further credits for imports to the peninsula. London was less successful in gaining full American cooperation for its policy of attraction toward Madrid. Opinion in Washington was more categorically anti-Franco, and some concern existed there about the extension of “Spanish fascist” influence to Latin America. As the new American counsellor of embassy in Madrid in 1941 was to write forty years later, American attitudes were “more emotional, more ideological, and more influenced by what they read in the press” than were those of the British. Personal relations between Serrano Stier and the American ambassador, Weddell, were virtually suspended for six months after an incident on April 19 in which Weddell used strong language to protest German influence in Spain. Though more normal relations were restored in the early fall, Washington refused to give the degree of economic assistance to Spain that the British government deemed appropriate. The straitened British wartime economy could never provide all the consumer goods and fuel that Spain required, and indeed, by 1942 Spanish exports of iron ore and other vital raw materials to Britain reached such a volume that for the remainder of the war British authorities had difficulty balancing their accounts with Spain.”
By late April 1941 alarm in London about the possibility of German entrance into the Iberian peninsula or Francos entry into the war— sparked by the dramatic German victories in Yugoslavia and Greece— rapidly increased. On April 23 Churchill ordered preparation of an expeditionary force ready to sail at forty-eight hours’ notice to seize the Portuguese islands (the Azores and the Cape Verdes) if the peninsula fell under Axis control. "
"On June 9 Serrano received a personal letter from the Italian foreign minister Ciano urging him to convince Franco that the time had come to announce Spain's adherence to the Tripartite Pact, as pledged in the secret protocol of the preceding autumn. Serrano seems to have agreed and had a very long talk with his brother-in-law, whom he declared not averse to this step...Yet a meeting between Ciano and Ribbentrop on the fifteenth indicated that Germany had no interest in offering even minor enticements to bring Spain into the war.”
That response, coupled with Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, dampened Spanish interest in a more complete alignment with the Axis. Yet the attack on the Communist heartland elicited a strong emotional response, particularly from Falangists. Within forty-eight hours the government requested an opportunity for Spanish participation in some form short of official entry into the war. "
"Since Franco had no intention of declaring war on the Soviet Union at that point, Falangist leaders suggested the official formation of a “Blue Division” (dark blue was the Falangist color) of FET volunteers to fight beside the Germans on the Russian front. This found acceptance among Franco and other cabinet members, and registration of volunteers began on June 28, the seventh day of the German invasion. Falangist enthusiasm was intense; among the volunteers were six members of the National Council and seven civil governors, as well as some of the most militant younger leaders such as Enrique Sotomayor, soon to be killed in battle. Army commanders were themselves much less enthusiastic, and complained of Falangist domination of recruitment even among the regular military. As it turned out, however, nearly 70 percent of the volunteers came from the Army, as did nearly all officers, to ensure military leadership and coherence. Command was given to Muñoz Grandes, one of the best organizers among the few nominally Falangist generals. The first units of an initial force of 18,694 officers and men began to leave Spain on July 17 for further training in Germany, followed by a volunteer contingent of combat aviators who formed a “Blue Squadron.” The Blue Division later formed as German Division 250 on the northern sector of the eastern front just below Leningrad. It entered into combat on October 4, under German command but always technically subordinate to the Spanish Ministry of the Army.*"
"In the following month an agreement was signed with Germany to provide 100,000 workers for the increasingly strained German industrial force, though none left Spain for months. In the long run no more than 15,000 were sent, compared to approximately 10,000 Spanish workers who worked daily for the British in Gibraltar throughout the war. "
The Political Crisis of May 1941
"With Republican and leftist opposition still weak and vigorously repressed, Francos principal domestic political problems concerned the management of the three main pillars of his power, the military, the Falangists, and the monarchists. Of these, the military would always be the most important, and senior commanders with few exceptions continued to support Franco's leadership. Though Spanish generals were mostly pro-German, there was little quarrel with his reluctance to enter the war, for military opinion generally agreed that the country was in no position to do so. Many senior officers disagreed sharply with other aspects of state policy, however. Criticism mounted over domestic policy, fueled by increasingly severe shortages (bread rationing had been introduced in January 1941), the rapid growth of corruption, and the frequent inefficiency of the new state system, with its often clumsy bureaucratic controls. Ever more intense hostility was focused on the pretensions of Falangists, and more concretely, on their primary spokesman, Serrano Súñer, whose political ascendancy was bitterly resented. Serrano was detested by the military and others not simply because of his power but also because of the manner in which he exercised it. Serrano Súñer did not wear his authority lightly; he was increasingly intemperate in speech and manner, arrogant and overweening, the object of constant attention in the official media. His pro- Axis statements, particularly those made to his favorite interlocutors of the Italian Fascist press, were more frequent and extreme than those of Franco. Army officers and anti-Falangists resented his pride, power, and leadership of Falangism, monarchists held him partly responsible for the regimes failure to recognize the monarchy, and malcontents and critics of diverse stripes detested him simply because he was the cuñadísimo, to the extent that the German intelligence chief could describe him in Berlin as “the most hated man in Spain.* Withal, he had more influence over Franco during the years of his ascendancy than did anyone else in the history of the regime; even Carrero Blanco in later years would not have the same personal authority with the Caudillo.
Yet the two scarcely saw eye to eye on all issues. Though they tended to agree on foreign policy, Serrano backed a more coherent and integrated, and to that extent a more fully fascist, political system than Franco was willing to permit. "
"Falangist assertiveness became more strident with the German military triumphs of 1940-41. While some radicals and Naziphiles conspired with German representatives,* FET leaders who had been collaborating with Serrano since 1937 urged him to take decisive action that would give the party greater power and coherence. The Falanges greatest influence lay in press and propaganda, dominated since 1938 by Antonio Tovar, press sub- secretary under the Ministry of Interior, and by Dionisio Ridruejo, FET director general of propaganda. In March, Tovar had signed an agreement with Paul Schmidt, his approximate counterpart in the German Foreign Ministry, authorizing the German foreign news agency Transocean to make use of the Spanish press in news distribution. With the approval of Serrano, who continued to supervise aspects of the Interior Ministry and the FET, Tovar signed an order on May 1 freeing all press organs of the Movement from censorship,* thereby creating an independent fascist press in Spain. "
"Franco agreed, but decided to balance this by appointing a close military associate as minister of the interior, on May 5 switching the staff officer and veteran Nationalist intriguer Col. Valentin Galarza, who had served as the subsecretary of his own presidency of the government since August 1939, to that post. A sometime monarchist, Galarza was above all a military bureaucrat devoted to the interests of the military elite. His appointment touched off a fire storm among hard-core Falangists, who considered domination of the Interior apparatus by what they termed the Casino Militar de Madrid a final insult to their own ambitions. Falangist loss of control of press censorship and Interior administration was followed two days later by other key appointments for enemies of the FET. A naval officer, Capt. Luis Carrero Blanco, replaced Galarza as subsecretary of the presidency, the Carlist Antonio Iturmendi was made subsecretary of the interior, and two leading monarchist generals, "
"This created the most serious crisis Franco had faced since the unification of the FET, for Galarza and the military demanded revenge. The Generalissimo faced the need to somehow placate both sides. Tovar had already resigned, Ridruejo (probably the main author of the article) was fired, and Serrano even tendered his own resignation as foreign minister, which Franco refused. During the next fortnight Franco carried out a partial reorganization of his cabinet that retained all its military appointees but offered greater representation to carefully selected Falangists, "
"The development of this crisis, following the first cabinet changes, had obviously taken Franco by surprise, and its two-week duration made it the longest cabinet crisis of the regime. The outcome by no means suc- ceeded in relieving all the tension between the military and Falangists, but it did reveal Francos growing skill in balancing them off against each other. Along with a number of other secondary appointments, this reorganization managed to meet the minimum demands of the military while conciliating their Falangist rivals.
The appointment of Arrese turned out to be one of Francos master strokes...
Arrese would eventually complete the task of bureaucratizing and domesticating the Falange that Serrano had never been able to complete. Although there seems to have been some sort of initial understanding that Serrano Súñer would retain some control over the FET, once Franco found Arrese fully obedient and effective he was given more and more direct power over the organization. "
"in November 1941 Arrese announced the beginning of the second and last purge in the partys history. It was designed to eliminate crypto-leftists, former Masons, and those guilty of “immoral” activity or simply activity “incompatible” with the party.” "
"Arreses leadership particularly emphasized the Catholic identity of the FET—later termed by one sociologist fascismo frailuno (friar fascism)— and this helped to bring the party even more closely in line with the overtly religious character invoked by the regime’s political syncretism. "
"Franco made one other major appointment in conjunction with the 1941 political realignment. One of his most pressing needs was another military man to replace Galarza as subsecretary (or chief executive assistant) to Francos presidency of the government, and for this he chose an aspiring naval officer, Capt. Luis Carrero Blanco, who would become his closest and most devoted subordinate and political associate for the next three decades unti] Carreros spectacular assassination in 1973. Carrero was a career naval officer who up until the Civil War had been a professor in the Escuela de Guerra Naval in Madrid. He escaped the bloody purge that killed 40 percent of the naval officer corps in the Republican zone, thanks to his lack of political involvement and the fact that he had no active command. The slaughter of naval officers only hardened his extreme right-wing convictions. He gained asylum in the Mexican embassy and thence fled to the Nationalist zone, where during the last phases of the war he commanded first a destroyer and then a submarine. He was later made chief of operations for the Navys General Staff."
"His own ideas ran more closely parallel to those of Franco than did Serranos thinking, for Carrero was more conservative, more military-oriented and semimonarchist in his convictions. The notion that subsequently developed to the effect that Carrero had no ideas of his own was exaggerated, but Carrero was carefully attuned to Francos wishes and extremely discreet in proffering his own advice. Differences of criteria between the two were surprisingly few, and Carrero became the nearest thing to a genuine alter ego that Franco would ever have. As this relationship began to develop during 1941-42, Serrano Súñer became more and more expendable. Carreros own orientation was more genuinely neutralist, and the first significant influence that he had on Franco was evidently exerted in that direction. As his executive and administrative secretary he set much of Francos agenda, filtering a large part of the information and advice that he received.
Thus the resolution of Franco's first major post—Civil War crisis, even though some of its aspects proved merely provisional, revealed once more his mastery of the major political forces behind the new regime. He retained the support of the military while rejecting their aim of a drastic downgrading of the Falange at a time when it seemed that the Axis was still winning the war. The manner in which he placated the Falangist op- position met his own terms far more than theirs, introducing the kind of Falangist leadership prepared to subordinate itself in return for a secondary place in the system...he outcome was therefore to widen Francos political options on several fronts and make him less dependent on his brother-in-law than before.
Internal security was being tightened through renewed repression of the opposition, an attempt to organize local resources for defense in case of foreign invasion,® and new efforts to improve at least a few aspects of state administration, particularly with some measure of control over the burgeoning black market. Serious black market offenses had been nominally subject to the death penalty for more than a year, and in March 1941 a number of “crimes of treason” were given the same penalty under military court jurisdiction. In November, two black marketeers were executed in Alicante, one of them the camisa vieja José Pérez de Cabo, author of the first pre—Civil War attempt at a book on Falangist doctrine.” He had been involved in the anti-Franco conspiracy of the clandestine junta politica, and friends later defended his name by claiming that the black market deals had been designed to finance the Falangist plot.”
Extreme shortages and privation for millions, accompanied by black- market operations of all kinds, reached a high point by 1941, the second severe year of hunger in a row for Spain. Crop yields for 1940 had been low, and the harvest was equally poor in 1941, its effects compounded by
the war and the disruption of foreign trade, which depressed food imports far below need. Severe privation had become a major factor in foreign relations, restricting closer alignment with Germany and increasing some- what the influence of Britain, whose control of the sea enabled it to regu- late food imports into Spain. "
"Francos first crisis of confidence in his brother-in-law seems to have developed during the following month. Part of the new cabinet was strongly anti-Serrano, and even the new Falangist ministers resented his influence. There is some evidence that Serrano made a direct offer to resign, all the while presenting himself as the victim of a right-wing monarchist conspiracy (though his enemies were much more numerous than that) and as Spains indispensable representative for proper relations with the Axis. Serrano made some effort to mend his fences with his diverse antagonists, and managed to regain the Generalissimo’ backing, weathering this new storm.” Franco, in turn, moved to protect himself against the mounting monarchist sentiment in the military command with a personal letter to Don Juan which stressed that the monarchy would eventually become the “coronation of Francos regime. The letter denounced the “blindness and incompetence’ of those who tried to opposethe monarchy to his own “National Movement.
In October 1941 Aranda took advantage of monarchist feelings to meet with some of the senior generals and seriously discuss the possibility of some sort of new military regency with or without Franco."
"In a subsequent letter of May 12, 1942, he assured Don Juan that he planned eventually to make him king of Spain,* just as in November 1942, after the Allied landings in northwest Africa, he privately assured Kindelán that the special name designating his successor which he kept in a little box in his office was that of Don Juan.*"
Foreign Policy in 1942
"Since American entry coincided with the stalemate of the German blitzkrieg before Moscow, it argued for Franco a lower profile for Spanish nonbelligerence in support of Germany. Therefore in February 1942 he dispatched the Army chief of staff, General Carlos Asensio, on an inspection tour of the Blue Division in Russia, and then requested provisional withdrawal of the Spanish unit, which Hitler did not grant. Soon afterward, supply facilities for German submarines were once more suspended just as the major phase of the Battle of the Atlantic began.
For Franco, all this was merely elemental discretion; it did not bring any modification of the generally pro-German stance of the Spanish press and public activities. There were still occasional demonstrations and stone-throwing incidents before the British embassy, while, partly because of a more aggressive American policy, relations with the United States embassy deteriorated.
In mid-February Franco had his first face-to-face meeting with Salazar at Badajoz (where, contrary to legend, he did not address the Portuguese leader in Galician but in Spanish). Though there could never be full collaboration between a genuinely neutral Portugal and a pro-Axis Spain, this encounter produced verbal reinforcement of the earlier 1939 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression "
"Moreover, during 1941—42 Germany was trying to play a more direct role in Spanish domestic affairs. By that point the Madrid embassy had the distinction of being the largest German embassy in the world,* packed with press and propaganda personnel charged with influencing Spanish opinion and gaining a stepping stone to Latin America as well. Since 1940 German penetration of Spanish news media and of certain aspects of cultural life had been extensive. The German press attaché Hans Lazar was said to have no less than 432 Spanish names, including those of many journalists, on his payroll.** The Italians, whose efforts had exceeded those of the Germans during the Civil War, fell far behind; during 1941 approximately three times as many German as Italian films were shown in Spain. By the beginning of 1942 a German “Grosse Plan” was being implemented to diffuse German propaganda even more broadly and to move more actively into Latin America as well.”
"Closest German contacts were almost always with members of the Falange, and generally the more radical the Falangist the more pro-Nazi he proved to be. Yet the only active liberal conspirator in the military hierarchy, Aranda, also had contacts with the local Nazi leaders Bernhardt and Thomsen during 1941,” hoping to gain German acceptance of a non- Falangist military regime in Spain. The expulsion of several lower-level German diplomatic personnel for dabbling in domestic politics did little to discourage such machinations.
On the eastern front, German authorities tried to convince Munoz Grandes and other Blue Division commanders of the need for a drastic change in Spanish policy, and seemed to be achieving some success. Muñoz Grandes was heard to say that things back in Spain were a mess and must be straightened out by a more effective government that would bring the country into the war. When word of these mutterings reached Franco, he relieved Muñoz Grandes of command in May 1942, innocently blaming it on the hostility of Varela and Serrano toward the Blue Division's commander. "
"Meanwhile, returning Blue Division veterans who might have been influenced by Muñoz Grandes were isolated as much as possible from positions of influence."
The Begoña Affair and the Political Crisis of August 1942
"The main goals of the military —complete ouster of Serrano Súñer and the downgrading or even outright abolition of the FET— were far from realization. Franco had no intention of capitulating to the political demands of the military, which could only weaken his own authority. He deemed the FET a useful and necessary instrument, not least because he still expected the Axis to win the war. The FET enabled him to staff a continuing system and provided an alternative to monarchist and right-wing pressure."
"Franco relied on Arrese and the more docile new Falangist leaders to keep party members in line, but the situation within the FET remained divided and unstable. Conversations between radical Falangists (and several main-line FET leaders as well) with German officials persisted on several levels, while the perpetual discontent of some of the camisas viejas continued to fester. Clandestine pamphlets appeared frequently, and by the spring of 1942 a new shadow “Falange Auténtica” announced its existence and was said to be carrying on contacts with high-ranking FET personnel, though Arrese monitored the situation to keep it from getting out of control.”"
"Even within the Italian government increasing doubt developed as to the future stability of the Spanish regime, and for the first time Ciano showed interest in courting the monarchist pretender as an alternative, inviting Don Juan to a special hunting party in Albania during April.” As public insults from and incidents with Falangists increased, the commanders of the Madrid garrison even issued instructions in mid-April that officers carry sidearms when off duty. At that point, the minister of war, Varela, who was the chief representative of military opinion in the government, had a serious talk with Franco, insisting that the present political balance within the government and the FET could not continue. Either the party should become the genuine amalgam of Falangists and Carlists that had been announced in 1937, which would mean that half the positions in the party should be awarded Carlists or other elements, or it should be dissolved. Similarly, Varela outlined two different schemes of cabinet reorganization, each of which would drastically down- grade Falangist influence. Several weeks later, on May 4, a cabinet meeting exploded into violent recriminations between Falangist and Army ministers.”
Franco redefined his position in a speech before the Sección Femenina of the FET at the Castillo de la Mota on May 29, in which he invoked the “totalitarian monarchy’ of the Catholic Monarchs as the inspiration of the regime. "
"While some generals grumbled about the need to replace what they called Francos totalitarian rule with a collective military government that would prepare the return of the monarchy, a new series of public brawls erupted between Falangist activists and Carlist and monarchist youth in Madrid, Pamplona, Burgos, and Santiago de Compostela. Indirectly encouraged by Varela in the War Ministry, Carlists showed increasing signs of dissidence. By July their leaders in Navarre and the Basque provinces were said to be discussing the desirability of having their remaining representatives within the system retire one by one, and at a Carlist parade in Bilbao on July 18 cries of “Muera Franco!” (“Death to Franco!”) were allegedly heard.'% Street affrays between Falangists and their rivals were becoming more frequent in the larger cities,'” and during the summer of 1942 tension remained high.
Though Franco stubbornly refused the military hierarchy the satisfaction of eliminating Serrano, the foreign minister's influence had declined since the cabinet crisis of the preceding year.
...Serrano mounted a counteroffensive of his own, preparing new legislation to regain control of the foreign news censorship"
"These rivalries finally came to a head after a bloody incident in the outskirts of Bilbao that turned into the most notorious cause celebre of the 1940s in Spain. As indicated, Carlist feeling in Navarre and the Basque provinces was strongly against the FET and the present structure of the regime. Feeling erupted once more at the annual memorial mass held August 16 in the sanctuary of the Virgen de Begona in Bilbao, in memory of Requetés fallen in the Civil War. A small group of Falangist activists outside the church were identified at the ceremony, taunted (and allegedly faced with a few cries of “Muera Franco!”), and according to the Falangists, assaulted. The Falangists responded by tossing two hand grenades into the crowd of Carlists, which may or may not have caused fatalities (Carlist sources claim there were ultimately two deaths) but wounded between 30 and 117, depending on various accounts."
"General Varela happened to be inside the sanctuary at the time of the incident. He immediately seized on it as evidence of a Falangist attack on the military (which he alleged might even have involved an assassination attempt), sending telegrams in this vein to all district captains generals and protesting vehemently to Franco. He was seconded by the interior
minister, Galarza, who dispatched similar messages to civil governors throughout Spain. The six Falangists arrested in Begoña were then tried by court-martial.
Franco was greatly displeased by the initiatives of Varela and Galarza, which he considered excessive, imprudent, and even potentially insubordinate. Yet Varela succeeded in mobilizing the sympathies of much of the military hierarchy, and despite Falangist pressure, Franco hesitated to intervene in the court-martial (he scarcely ever intervened) even though he deeply resented the Carlist rally and the cries of “Long Live the King!” that had accompanied it. Several of the Falangists under indictment were Blue Division veterans who sought a regime under full control of the Falange, and entry into the war on the side of Germany. All six were convicted, two receiving the death penalty, and one of these, Juan Domínguez (a national inspector of the SEU and the person responsible for throwing the one grenade that exploded) was executed at the beginning of September.''”
Meanwhile, Varela demanded of Franco direct political satisfaction against the Falange. According to one version,” the conversation became so hostile that Franco realized he would have no alternative but to dismiss Varela. He also decided to remove Galarza, whom he blamed for having run a slack ship and for having withheld information on the incident,"
"When Franco communicated these new personnel decisions to his sub- secretary, Carrero Blanco, who had for some time been conniving with Arrese to eliminate Serrano, Carrero warned him that firing two Army ministers alone without firing their political counterparts would create serious complications. Serrano had done more than Arrese to try to save Domínguez, and Carrero warned that if Serrano were allowed to retain his ministry, the military and all other non- or anti-Falangists would say that Serrano and the FET had won a complete victory and that Franco was no longer in full control.''?* Franco seems to have required little convincing, for he had become increasingly restive with Serrano, who tended to contradict and criticize him more and more, and had already suggested resigning.””"
"None of the major political contestants—the military, Falangists, main- line monarchists, or Carlists—were fully satisfied with the results. All things considered, the military gained rather more than the others, but this new balancing act by no means stilled Army criticism, which remained fairly vehement in some circles of the officer corps.''* Yet the new combination of September 1942 was shrewdly chosen to balance all these forces off against each other, and proved the most manageable since the Civil War.
Franco thus survived two internal crises in less than eighteen months, demonstrating an increasing ability to manage the diverse elements of the Nationalist elite. "